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Abstract 
This article scrutinizes the phenomenon of Local Government Election (Local election) of a regency at the 
easternmost province in Indonesia, Jayapura Regency of Papua. During the election period, there was a great 
number of violations against election rules which were not only sporadic but also designed on a structured, 
systematic and massive scale – using the term of Indonesian Constitutional Courts. The violations were related to 
the role of the oligarchs who cooperatively worked hand in hand to win the political contestation. The activities of 
the oligarchs which involved clerical-technical issues are undoubtedly prohibited by the Law of Pilkada. The 
clerical-technical issues include unlawful activities such as replacing some officials of polling station a day before 
the election, manipulating the official report documents like voting and the calculation of the votes forms, 
certificates of results and holographic forms of the votes calculation details and records of the results of valid vote 
calculation at the polling stations in massive numbers. In the Jayapura Regency Election, it is found that the 
practice of the election administration regime is defied by an electoral shadow structure played by the Oligarchs. 
Thus, this article argues that the political decentralization results in a powerful control of the local oligarchs on the 
Local Elections which must be solved for the sake of Indonesia’s democratization. 
Keywords: the role of local oligarchs, electoral integrity, structured, systematic and massive violations 
1. Introduction  
In the year of 2017, Indonesia held the Local Elections (Pilkada) simultaneously in 101 autonomous regions, 
including 8 provinces, 76 regencies, and 18 cities. The Indonesian Election Authority stated that most of the 
regional elections had taken places in a democratic, safe and peaceful manner while there were some local elections 
stained by some political problems such as violations, fraud and physical conflicts among the supporters of each 
candidate. The 2017 local election is part of the democracy implementation in Indonesia which commenced to 
emerge after the fall of Soeharto’s New Order.  
1.1 The Practice of Local Elections in Indonesia  
Since 2004, the mechanism of appointing the head of local governments in Indonesia was not performed by the 
local parliaments but directly by the people. Thus, the principle of One Person, One Vote and One Value 
(OPOVOV) has been implemented since that time. However, the mechanism of direct elections in Indonesia’s 
regions raised a number of issues, especially outside the land of Java which mostly was facing social problems 
such as educational lags, economic gaps, and social group tensions. With those occurring problems, they were 
forced to practice the political liberalization, resulting in the practices of manipulative supports by the local 
political elites in the implementation of Local Elections. Instead of strengthening the process of institutionalization 
and the institutions in the regions, the local political elites demonstrated the practices of unhealthy politics. As 
time went by, the practices of political manipulations had decreased significantly at local elections in the following 
years. However, at some regions like the province of Papua, the easternmost province of Indonesia, those kinds of 
political manipulations still stained the practice of local elections in Indonesia.  
1.2 Electoral Democracy Post-Soeharto 
In 1998, after the reform had successfully deposed the power of Soeharto, Indonesia commenced feeling the spring 
of democracy. People’s demands, especially of the university students, urged the constitutional reformation in 
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Indonesia, the autonomization of regions, the removal of the military in national and local politics and the 
eradication of corruption, collusion and nepotism. With the first general election held in 1999 after the fall of 
Soeharto, Indonesia commenced entering an aimless political liberalization. The subsequent elections were not 
more than the practices of procedural democracy to appoint the leaders. It can be said that Indonesia has not found 
the form of substantial democracy even after conducting the general elections four times after the fall of Soeharto.  
1.3 The Election Day 
One troublesome local election of those 101 simultaneous local elections in 2017 was the local election of Jayapura 
Regency. In this election, the involvements of external parties, especially from the structure of local government, 
were strongly indicated. Those involvements even touched the area of electoral processes. Although the case had 
been resolved by the national state institution which especially was assigned to resolve election issues, the case of 
Jayapura Regency local election had stained the history of the contemporary practice of general elections in 
Indonesia. The election day of Jayapura Regency was held on February 15, 2017. The election contested five pairs 
of candidates (Note 1), each of whom had divergent social, economic, educational and political backgrounds. The 
number of voters was 131.283 people, spread across 139 villages and 19 districts. At the election day, the voters 
were provided with 347 polling stations by the Jayapura Regency General Election Commission. In each district, 
there were five members of the District Election Committee (PPD). Thus, the total member of PPD is 475 people 
(5x95). In each village, there were three members of the Voting Committee (PPS). Thus, the total number of PPS 
is 1443 people (3x342). The law of Election in Indonesia required election supervision by the Election Supervisory 
Agency (Panwaslu). In the case of Jayapura Regency election, there were 3 people of Panwaslu at the regency 
level, 57 people at the district level (3x18) and 432 people at each polling station. (Note 2) 
1.4 Malpractice in Local Election of Jayapura Regency 
The local election of Jayapura regency staked the concept of integrity in the practice of general election. The 
electoral crisis in the local election had been indicated at the early stage. On the 29th of August 2017, the incumbent 
candidate replaced three officials in the regency government of Jayapura (Note 3), prohibited by the law of Pilkada 
in Indonesia. At the D-1, there was a turnover of 160 people of Voting Committee Group (KPPS) at 234 polling 
stations, which was not recognized by the local General Election Commission (KPU). (Note 4) After receiving a 
report from the candidate number 1, Panwaslu conducted an investigation whose result was recommended to the 
KPUD for the Re-voting in 17 of the 19 districts. At the judgment of Panwaslu, the voting and the counting on the 
15th of February 2017 was invalid. (Note 5) The Panwaslu recommendation was opposed by the 19 district heads 
in Jayapura district and the Jayapura Regency KPU with the arguments that the Re-election (PSU) did not have a 
clear legal basis. The KPU further argued that this was an imaginary decision of Panwaslu. (Note 6) In the assembly 
of the Election Organizers Honor Council (DKPP), which was scheduled to examine alleged violations of the code 
of ethics, the ranks of the KPU and Panwaslu were found guilty. (Note 7) 
1.5. Literature Review 
The application of the integrity of elections is a necessity in the implementation of elections. The inevitability of 
the integrity of this Election in the context of achieving the election objectives such as to elect officeholders in the 
government, who will later determine the course of the state / regional government. The practice of elections that 
do not have integrity aside from not encouraging the adoption of internationally recognized democratic election 
standards with the honest and fair electoral principles, will delay and even fail to reach the goals of the election 
itself (Maisel & Buckley, 2005, pp. 56). It is an inevitable fact that not all elections meet expectations. Most 
elections that take place and end without integrity, are indicated with several indicators. Some of the most 
damaging indicators of Election integrity are the ballot boxes filled by those who are not officials, the election 
results figures manipulated either reduced or added, the involvement on the vote counts, election participants 
rejecting the results of the election process, and officials misusing the sources of state power (Norris, 2014, p. 3). 
Elections without integrity are also characterized by negative traits in elections, such as election malpractice, 
defective elections, manipulated contests, and election fraud. These negative signs should be countered by positive 
signs such as credible elections, acceptable elections, originality of election processes and results, and fair and 
honest elections (Norris, 2012, pp. 3-4). In all concepts of Election with integrity, the electoral process avoids the 
possibility of defective and failed elections, with clear standards and consistent benchmarks to assess the quality 
of each contestation. The quality of elections with integrity also refers to contestations that respect international 
standards and global norms that contain the regulation of elections leading to the implementation of appropriate 
elections (Norris, 2016, pp. 3-4). 
The former Secretary General of the United Nations, who before his decease was active in chairing the Global 
Commission for Elections, Democracy, and Security, urged the importance of the role of civil society organizations 
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to monitor the performance of the government so that the elections were expected to meet the integrity of the 
Election. The stance of the government in elections must be with civil society organizations. Furthermore, the 
government should contribute to the development of electoral integrity, election funding, and protection of free 
media (Annan, et al., 2012, p. 8-9). Following the urgency of Global Commission under Annan, the International 
Institute of IDEA described how important regional organizations are in the effort to create elections with integrity. 
In addition to overseeing the electoral process damaging election integrity through election malpractice, it is 
recommended that elections must be held with true integrity (Cordenillo & Ellis, et al. p. 15). 
The influences of the political environment in the relationship between the center (national government) and the 
regions (local government) on the local dynamics in Indonesia is also presented in this research. Since the fall of 
the Soeharto’s New Order in 1998, the political constellation has continued to change. On one hand, the fall of the 
New Order became a landmark of the end of the New Order's autocratic, despotic and bureaucratic power (Winters, 
2011, pp. 135-207). On the other side, the power structure in Indonesia transformed to be decentralized, democratic 
and pluralistic forms (Nordlholt & Klinken, 2007, p. 20) in a political constellation known as the Reform Order. 
Habibie, who succeeded Soeharto, loosened repression in the context of relations between the center and the 
regions. This policy was taken by Habibie to answer the demand on the largest possible autonomy of most regions, 
as well as to dispel the demands of other regions that were strict in demanding an independence from Indonesia, 
while the remainder was due to proposals from a number of political elites at the national level suggesting the 
reformation of unitary state to become federal state (Lane, 2014, pp. 7-19). 
How Habibie led the state after the fall of Soeharto exceeded the predictions and expectations of many. In the 
relations between the center and the region, Habibie transformed Indonesia, which was originally known as the 
most centralized country in the world, to become one of the most decentralized countries. The World Bank dubbed 
Habibie's radical policy as "the big bangs decentralization" (Shah & Thompson, 2004, p. 317). This epithet is 
meant to describe two things relating to the radicalism of decentralization policies. First, the radicalism of the 
increasing number of the local government administration in Indonesia, which before the implementation of the 
decentralization policy was originally merely 208 autonomous regions, consisting of 25 provinces, 151 regencies 
and 32 cities (Pratikno, 2008) later became 516 autonomous regions, consisting of 32 provinces, 388 regencies 
and 96 cities. After two decades of implementing decentralization policies, as of July 2018, the country of 
Indonesia has 542 autonomous regions, consisting of 34 provinces, 415 districts, and 98 cities (KEMENDAGRI, 
2018). Secondly, along with the proliferation of autonomous regions, the transfer of funds from the center also 
increased to regions, increased from 2001 to 2006 by 30 percent through a number of general allocation fund 
schemes, special allocation funds, and revenue sharing funds (Fengler & Hofman, p. 245). In 2017, the fund 
transfer schemes from the center to the regions have become more significant. Those funding schemes included a 
general transfer fund of IDR 503.6 trillion, a special transfer fund of IDR 173.4 trillion, a regional incentive fund 
of IDR 7.5 trillion, moreover a village autonomy funding scheme of IDR 60 trillion. Decentralization in the form 
of government administration, which is supported by fiscal decentralization, in addition to supporting the capacity 
of the local economy, and coupled with political decentralization has succeeded in dynamizing the locals' life and 
local political constellation. (Note 8) Decentralization in the form of administration governance, which is 
supported by fiscal and political decentralization, besides supporting the capacity of the local economy has 
succeeded in dynamizing the social and political constellation in regions. 
Concerns about the negative impacts on radical implementation of decentralization have emerged along with the 
introduction of these policies. These concerns are formulated as "the decentralization of grafting", with 
characteristics of (i) the absence of transparency and accountability in traditional local governance values; (ii) the 
safety of the people who assume that local politicians and administrators are generally more open to local needs 
and complaints, and are subsequently surprised by the contradicting reality; and (iii) the fragmentation of the state 
civil apparatus and the apparently uncontrolled authority of the gatekeepers of the services, that is, the head of 
regional government and the apparatus, due to the system of patronage (Hofman, et al, pp. 99-113). This concern 
was in fact proven because, in a number of regions, negative phenomena emerged due to the fragility of political 
institutionalization in the process of decentralization, such as the "congregational" corruption by the members of 
the West Sumatra Local House of Representatives (DPRD), and the following corruption case of the Governor of 
Aceh and the Chairman of the Banten Provincial DPRD (Crouch, 2010, pp. 223-229). It has been two decades 
since the implementation of decentralization. In only 2018, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) 
determined 108 people as suspects with various profiles of public figures such as legislative members, law 
enforcement officers, and regional heads. (Note 9) Other negative effects are the birth of political gangster 
phenomena (Wilson, 2010, pp. 199-216), "small kings" at the local level as political corruption combatants 
(Hofman et al, pp. 99-113), political champions (Romli, 2007), and bossism and local strongmen (Sidel, 2004, pp. 
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51-74). Another more dynamic aspect was the formation of the sultanistic oligarchs of Soeharto's autocratic 
heritage (Winters 2011, Winters 2012, p. 30), and those that exploited fragility or even caused the increasingly 
fragile political democratization at the local level (Hadiz & Robison, 2013, pp. 35-57). In the formation of this 
oligarchic power, the political phenomenon of Jayapura Regional Election is associated with the Resource 
Dependence Theory, with Emerson (1962, pp. 31-41) as its main proponent, which basically stated "the 
entanglement" of the election regime in the midst of oligarchic co-optation on the power structure.  
2. Method 
The focus of this study is to scrutinize the phenomenon of the Local Election (Pilkada) in Jayapura Regency which 
was located at Indonesia's easternmost province, Papua Province in 2017. This study aims to answer why many 
problems which were related to the aspect of election integrity in the Jayapura still exist in the Regency Election. 
To explore answers, the researcher uses a case study method, while the approach utilized in this research is a 
qualitative approach, an approach that emphasizes the procedure for collecting, organizing, understanding, 
analyzing, and presenting systematically. Hence, the results of the studies conducted can be expected to be more 
contextual and able to describe the conditions more intact and answer what actually happened (Yin, 2018), in the 
event of the 2017 Jayapura Regency election disintegrity. 
In addition to relying on in-depth interviews with a number of informants which was considered as primary data 
sources, this research also utilized official documents, legal decisions, court decisions, Jayapura Regency General 
Election Commission (KPU) office, KPU of Papua Province, Supervisory Jayapura Regency Election (Panwaslu), 
Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) of Papua Province, and KPU at the central level and Bawaslu at the central 
level, as well as Decision of Election Organizers Honorary Board (DKPP) - Election ethics council whose duty 
and authority was to examine, hear, and decide cases based on the code of ethics for election organizers. Sources 
of data from mass media news, which are considered as secondary data, are also taken into consideration in this 
study. The research location, not only in Papua but also in the offices of the institutions mentioned above, as well 
as the central office in Jakarta. 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Election Candidates  
The Jayapura Regency Election in 2017 contested five pairs of Regent and Vice-Regent candidate pairs. (Note 10) 
The first candidate is Yanni, a Muslim woman who is also the Chairperson of the Papua Gerindra Party. The figure 
was described as a trusted person of Gerindra Party Chairman Prabowo Subianto in Papua. Prabowo is a 
presidential candidate who failed to win over President Joko Widodo in the 2014 elections and re-nominate himself 
in this 2019 election against President Joko Widodo. Yanni paired up with Zadrah Afanya, a senior manager in 
the Sinar Mas Group business group owned by Chinese blood tycoon Eka Tjipta Widjaja. This pair is politically 
endorsed by the Gerindra Party. The party is in coalition with the National Awakening Party (PKB), a party made 
by tolerant Muslim leaders including the former Indonesian 4th President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001). This 
candidate was also supported by the National Mandate Party (PAN), the party made by the main figure of the most 
important reform and the opponent of Soeharto's New Order, Prof. Amien Rais, a figure who once both promoted 
and impeached Abdurrahman Wahid from the presidency. This pair is carried by six seats in the Jayapura Regency 
DPRD.  
The second pair of Regent and Vice-Regent candidate are Mathius Awoitauw and Giri Wijayantoro. Awoitauw is 
an incumbent of the regent leading Jayapura Regency from 2012 to 2016. He is also the brother of the Chairperson 
of the Jayapura Regency DPRD, Edison Awoitauw, who was later appointed by his younger brother as the head 
of the campaign team and experienced in holding elections for he had served as the Chairman of the local KPU 
for two periods. The incumbent stood with Giri Wijayantoro, described by the local media as an "active and 
successful figure in clearing forests in Development Region IV of Jayapura Regency, covering Yapsi, Kaureh, and 
Airu Districts Jayapura Regency, but backed by Jayapura Regional Police Chief, Regent Mathius Awoitauw, and 
Chairperson of the local DPRD also incumbent brother, Edison Awoitauw." (Note 11) The main supporters of this 
candidate pair are the NasDem Party, a party made by Surya Paloh who is the owner of the biggest news television 
channel in Indonesia, Metro-TV. The party was in coalition with the Hanura Party, a party made by the former 
ABRI Commander when Indonesia entered the transition of power from President Soeharto to President B.J. 
Habibie, namely General (ret.) Wiranto. Other coalition members are parties whose general chairperson is former 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2009 and 2009-2015). The pair was supported by eleven local DPRD 
seats. 
The third pair of Regent and Vice-Regent candidate are Godlief Ohee and Frans Gina. With the social background 
as indigenous rulers and social activists, the pair of candidates of Ohee and Gina nominated themselves as the 
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candidates with the full support of the indigenous people of Ondofolo leaders and Yeheskiel Wally living around 
Danau Sentani, Jayapura. This candidates pair promises to bring changes for the indigenous people in Jayapura 
Regency, especially for the improvement of the future of the (beradat) norm-based young generation. As the 
children of the land of Jayapura, in their point of view, the development of Jayapura has not yet touched indigenous 
peoples. If they succeed in winning the elections, they promise to raise the dignity of the indigenous people for a 
better life. Their candidacy in the Jayapura Regency Regional Election is performed through independent way 
(without the support of political parties). 
The fourth pair of Regent and Vice-Regent candidate is Siska Yoku and Marselino Waromi. Like the previous 
candidate, these Papuan female leaders nominated themselves as individual (independent) candidates. Siska is the 
Chairperson of the local Indonesian Employers Association (Apindo). She has been active in the management of 
the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI). As an alumnus of the Law Faculty of the Cendrawasih University 
in Jayapura decided to stand with Waromi, who had once established and even served as Chair of the Papua 
Regional Unity Party (PPD). Previously, she was a Deputy Chairperson of the Jayapura City Golkar Party DPD. 
But in the 2014 General Election, she became a legislative candidate for the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party 
(PKPI). As independent pairs of the candidate, their vision was to advance the Papua people, especially the people 
who live in Jayapura Regency. 
The fifth pair of Regent and Vice-Regent candidate are Jansen Monim and Abdul Rahman Sulaiman. Monim 
managed to obtain a degree in engineering and completed a master degree in management at the Widya Jayakarta 
College of Economics, Jakarta. He is also a functionary of the Indonesian National Sports Committee (KONI) in 
Papua, precisely as the Regional Chairperson of the Indonesian Paddle Sports Association (PODSI) of Jayapura 
City. Monim once had a career in the Papua Province government bureaucracy, with the last position being the 
Head of the Public Works Office of the Papua Province. In this election, Monim stood with a local Muslim leader, 
who is also a member of the Jayapura Regency DPRD for the period of 2017-2022 from the Golkar Party faction, 
Abdul Rahman Sulaiman. As a Papuan Muslim leader, Sulaiman easily obtained a great number of supports with 
the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), so the pair of candidates pocketed 11 seats in the Jayapura Regency DPRD.  
3.2 The Crisis of the Jayapura Regency Regional Election  
3.2.1 Before the Election Day 
According to the law of Pilkada, incumbents are prohibited to conduct a change of office personnel six months 
before the date of the candidate pair confirmation until the end of the term of office unless having obtained a 
written approval from the Minister of Home Affairs, and if the candidate proved to do so may be disqualified from 
the nomination and/or winning results. (Note 12) The incumbent of Jayapura Regent was sued by candidate pair 
number 5 Jansen Monim and Abdul Rahman Sulaiman because the action of changing regency high officials at 
the middle period of Pilkada was considered as a violation against the rules. (Note 13) The number 3 candidate 
pair Godlief Ohee and Frans Gina also filed a lawsuit to Bawaslu, with the same argument as the claim of the 
candidate pair number 5. (Note 14) The incumbent on August 29, 2016 replaced three high-ranking officials within 
the Jayapura Regency Government, namely (i) Head of the Department of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives 
(Perindagkop); (ii) Head of Industry in the Department of Industry and Trade; and (iii) Director of the Yowari 
Hospital in Jayapura Regency. The central Bawaslu, after receiving and reviewing reports from candidate number 
5, states that what was done by incumbents was illegal, and further ordered the KPU of Papua Province through 
the central KPU to disqualify the nomination of the incumbent, Mathius Awoitauw. 
One day before Election Day (pre-election), there was a change of officers at some of the Polling Station (TPS). 
This change is very ironic because it is not recognized by the local KPU ranks, as stated by the Chairperson of the 
local KPU in the DKPP session (Note 15). This recognition was denied by the Papua Provincial KPU in the trial. 
Members of the KPU Papua stated that there was actually a meeting of the Head of the KPU of Jayapura Regency 
with one of the candidates on February 18, 2017, and arranged for the replacement of KPPS officers. The 
Provincial KPU admitted, 160 Voting Committee Groups (KPPS) at 234 polling stations (TPS) in Jayapura District 
did not have the appointment decision letter during the implementation of the February 15, 2017, regional election. 
The Papua Provincial KPU considered that the implementation of the Jayapura regional election was not legitimate 
or illegal. In the direct sentence, "we got the candidate campaign number 1 report that out of 348 polling stations 
in Jayapura Regency, there were 234 polling stations for which KPPS and PPS were replaced without legal 
procedures" (Note 16). Pair candidate number 1 stated, from 348 polling stations spread across 19 districts in 
Jayapura Regency, the day before the Election Day, there were 1,002 officers at 240 polling stations who carried 
out the voting and counting process at 240 polling stations which were illegal (Note 17). 
3.2.2 The Voting Day 
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At Hinekombe polling stations number 10, two voters had 129 Forms of the C6-KWK and shared with at least 
four other people. This form is a letter of invitation issued by the Voting Committee (PPS, in each village), as a 
requirement to attend and be able to use the right to vote. In order to hear the report, the Panwaslu immediately 
conducted an investigation and its results stated that they were eligible to be processed to court. (Note 18) The 
panel of judges of the Jayapura District Court in the trial on March 15, 2017, sentenced two defendants for an 
imprisonment of 1 year 3 months and a fine of 14 million IDR. The defendants were proven legally and 
convincingly to have misused the invitation letter. (Note 19) 
The results of the election on February 15, 2016, showed that candidate number 1 obtained 17,177 votes, number 
2 obtained 42,286 votes, number 3 earned 5,190 votes; number 4 gets 775 votes; and number 5 gets 15,752 votes 
(Note 20). But the results of the vote count provoked the other four candidates to protest. On February 23, 2017, 
the four candidates raised objections. Along with their protests, Panwaslu recommended the PSU. Finally, the 
recapitulation was stopped for several weeks. 
The recapitulation process on February 24, 2017, was chaotic, due to the replacement of the KPPS officers one 
day before the voting. The protests from the four candidates were also due to unavailability of the forms of C-
KWK Model, C1-KWK Model, and the Attachment C1-KWK Hologram Model, but those of photocopies at all 
348 polling stations. (Note 21) The three types of forms should be fully held and filled by KPPS and the witnesses 
of the candidate pairs at the polling station. But, at the later days, the legal team of the candidate number 1 was 
reported that they were in the local KPU Office. A few days later, the suspecting activity was also reported to the 
local Panwaslu. With the video evidence included, the legal team of the local KPU secretariat was seen to fill in 
the Forms of the C-KWK Model, C1-KWK Model, and Attachment of the holographic C1-KWK Model, (Note 
22) while also stating the filling of the three types of forms was massive. This is proved by a signature and a 
fraudulent signature of the KPPS and candidate witnesses in the Form Model C-KWK document, the ordinary C1-
KWK model which is not holographic and attached to the witness Paslon after the vote count at the polling station. 
(Note 23) This is not only an extraordinary crime that violates the law and injures democracy but also affects the 
results of the vote counting to be legally flawed and unguaranteed. (Note 24) 
In the Plenary Meeting of the District Level Vote Recapitulation on February 24, 2017, Panwaslu recommended 
the need for a re-Voting Day (Pemungutan Suara Ulang – PSU) in 236 out of 248 polling stations in 17 districts, 
(Note 25) arguing that KPPS officers were not listed in the appointment decrees, but they are totally new names. 
(Note 26) The PSU is a re-election mechanism at the polling station if the voting and counting process in a polling 
station is found when it is proved that there are irregularities, frauds or riots. DKPP in its decision strengthened 
the recommendations of the Election Supervisory Committee and ordered the Provincial KPU to take over the 
process of the ongoing stage, (Note 27) moreover since the Supervisory Committee's recommendation to conduct 
the PSU made the Election phase continue. However, the recommendations of the Panwaslu above were initially 
opposed by the Jayapura Regency KPU while stating that the Panwaslu’s PSU recommendations were unfounded 
and were merely imaginary forms because they were baseless. (Note 28) The opposition to the PSU was also 
indicated by the district heads. The District Heads of 19 different districts held a meeting in the Deputy Regent of 
Jayapura Regency Meeting Room on March 3, 2017, to draft a letter which essentially rejected the implementation 
of the PSU recommendations submitted by Panwaslu. The letter was given a header with the term of "Association 
of District Heads" - organizations judged not having a legal basis for its formation - signed by the 19 District Heads 
in Jayapura Regency and who were given Number 06 / AKD-III / 2017 March 3, 2017 concerning The Stance 
Statement on the recommendation of the District Head Association. (Note 29) 
The letter from the District Heads was addressed to the Chairperson of the Indonesian DKPP in Jakarta, containing: 
(i) the polemic that developed after the Pilkada was deliberately carried out by the two election management 
institutions; (ii) explicitly reject the PSU in 236 districts in 17 districts that are not based on the rules and results 
of a thorough study and supporting factual data; (iii) If point 2 above is forced to be implemented, as a political 
coach at the district level we are not responsible for horizontal conflicts that will occur; and (iv) The 
implementation of PSU without a clear legal basis is a form of professionalism and accountability of the organizers. 
(Note 30) The action taken by the 19 district head above was investigated by Panwaslu and Sentra Gakkumdu. 
After conducting a series of hearings, in the reading of the verdict, the Panel of Judges of the Jayapura District 
Court convicted the 19 district heads in Jayapura Regency. They are judged to be legally and convincingly proven 
to have committed criminal offenses as stipulated in the provisions of Article 188 of Act Number 1 of 2015. The 
Judges sentenced them with a one-month prison and a fine of Rp600 thousand and 15 (fifteen) months subsidies. 
(Note 31) 
In the consideration of the Assembly's decision, they judged that (i) The defendants as district heads are regional 
officials or ASN officials who are prohibited from involving themselves or being involved in the political process, 
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especially the Jayapura Regency Regional Election in 2017, as stated in the provisions of Article 71 paragraph (1) 
Law Number 10 of 2016; (ii) Defendant's actions were beneficial for the candidate of the regent and deputy regent 
number 2 Mathius Awoitauw and Giri Wijayantoro, because the Defendants knew that from the vote count results 
on February 15, 2017, at 346 polling stations and on vote counting at the 19 district level candidate pair number 2 
has the most votes from the other 4 Candidates, so the defendants reject the PSU with the intention of continuing 
the stages of recapitulation of the vote counts that already existed at the Regency KPU level, and this situation will 
make candidate number 2 win or, in other words, be re-elected as a regent and deputy regent of Jayapura Regency; 
(iii) By rejecting or opposing the recommendations of the Jayapura Regency Election Supervisory Committee, the 
defendants have not yet or did not obtain the certainty of vote acquisition as a result of administrative violations 
as the Panwaslu recommendation letter Number 094/Panwas.Kab.JJP/II/2017 dated February 23, 2017; (iv) The 
Panel of Judges also assessed that the defendants as district heads or regional officials or ASN officials had clearly 
made their alignments, when they and their wives took pictures together with Paslon number 2 using blue uniforms 
and brandished 2 (two) fingers as a symbol of Paslon Mathius Awoitauw and Giri Wijayantoro. Therefore, 
according to the Assembly, the defendants made decisions and/or actions that were beneficial and/or detrimental 
to pairs of the candidate. (Note 32) 
On July 28, 2017, the regent candidate number 1 Yanni reported the Chairperson and members of the KPU of 
Papua Province with report No. 29/LP/PGBW/VII/2017, which basically stated that the problem after the KPU 
Papua only stipulated 229 polling stations of 348 polling stations in 19 districts resulting in 119 polling stations, 
not in the PSU considered invalid (Note 33). After conducting an in-depth study, Bawaslu through letter Number 
0604/ K.Bawaslu/PM.06.00/VIII/2017, recommended to the national KPU and KPU Papua to (i) conduct an 
examination of 40 polling stations in 2 districts, namely Namblong and Kaureh, if there were differences in names 
- names that sign on the C1-KWK Model Form with the names listed in the KPPS Decree, then the PSU is carried 
out together with 229 predetermined polling stations; and (ii) Ensure that there is no change in the acquisition of 
votes at 79 polling stations outside the polling stations conducted by the PSU and polling stations conducted by 
scrutiny. (Note 34) 
On August 16, 2017, candidate number 1 Yanni reported the Chairperson and members of the Bawaslu Papua to 
the Republic of Indonesia Bawaslu through a report Number 22/LP/PGBW/VIII/2017 dated August 16, 2017, 
which basically stated the contents of the report regarding the notification of the status of the report issued by the 
Papua Election Supervisory Body on the report Number 21/LP/PGBW/VIII/2017 with a review of the findings of 
the Jayapura Panwaslu Number 005/TM/Pilbup-Kab. Jpr/II/2017. Again, Bawaslu on August 21, 2017, issued a 
Recommendation Number 0648/K.Bawaslu/PM.06.00/VIII/2017, in essence, the need to examine 39 Forms of 
Model C-1 KWK which was signed by people not listed in the photocopy of the KPPS Decree. Finally, the day 
after, Bawaslu issued a letter Number 0651/K.Bawaslu/PM.06.00/VIII/2017 containing directions to the Bawaslu 
Papua to resolve the disputed issue. 
3.2.3 Election Settlement  
The crisis of Jayapura Regency Election in 2017 ended after the Constitutional Court (MK) decided to reject the 
dispute over the election results submitted by Paslon number 3. The MK argued that all the riots had been resolved 
when the KPU followed up the DKPP Decision to conduct the PSU, while the vote after The result of the PSU 
was obtained: number 1 candidates were 9,255 votes, number 2 was 34,630, number 3 was 2,078 votes, number 4 
was 686 votes, and number 5 was 11,582 with a total of 58,231 votes (Note 35). Thus, from the results of the vote 
acquisition of the PSU on August 23, 2017 exceeded the 2 percent threshold as the minimum requirements for 
vote difference determined by the election law, so the Constitutional Court refused (dismissal) the candidate 
number 5 request on the grounds that the applicant had no legal standing (Note 36). According to the Indonesian 
constitution, the Constitutional Court's decision is final and binding. 
3.3 Local Election: The Test of Integrity 
The Jayapura Regency Regional Election in 2017 stakes the integrity of the elections in Indonesia. The objectives 
of Pilkada are indeed achieved such as the appointment of regional heads and deputy heads of the local regions, 
who are now inaugurated and run the wheels of local government. However, at the pursuit of the objectives of the 
elections, it is run in inelegant ways. The word of "inelegant" manifests through a proliferation of objections, 
frauds, and irregularities in the elections. The holding of elections that do not have integrity, in the case of the 
Jayapura Regional Head Election, does not encourage the validity and fairness of the principles of the General 
Election. The election process does not show credibility, because besides full of the obvious violations, the 
involvement of outside parties the election organizers stained the integrity as well. These outside parties should be 
prohibited from being involved in elections. 
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3.3.1 Integrity at Election Stages 
In general, the stages of the election consist of voter registration and updating the voter list, nomination, election 
campaigns, voting and counting, and determination of election results. At the first three stages, there is no fraud 
reported and it was handled by election stakeholders. However, the stages of voting and counting, which are at the 
main core of the General Election, indeed have a lot of election malpractice. First, the abuse of the invitation letter. 
On Election Day, there is a distribution of notification letters or invitation letters to names that do not have rights 
to receive them. The number of invitation letters held, not in a small number, is as many as 129 pieces. This number 
shows half more than the number of voters in a polling station. If the perpetrators are not quickly arrested and then 
not processed by local election supervisors, the malpractice of this election will definitely undermine the integrity 
of the voting and counting process. Fortunately, Election Supervisors move quickly and process it as a matter of 
election crime. In the rules of elections in Indonesia, the provision applies that the misuse of invitation letters, 
which should fall into the name of the voters, is a criminal act in the election. 
Secondly, the replacement of KPPS officers a day before the General Election Day. The results of the Panwaslu 
investigation stated that 1,002 of the 3,132 KPPS members in 240 polling stations and spread across 19 districts 
throughout the electoral district in the Jayapura regional election were not the official names appointed by the 
Jayapura Regency KPU. It is very ironic if the head of the local KPU, as the main person in charge of the elections, 
does not know the replacement of his subordinates. In the DKPP assembly, the Head of the Jayapura Regency 
KPU stated that there were indeed several names replaced due to illness and other reasons, but it did not change 
the names of the new KPPS. They further stated that they did not know about the change. Thus, it becomes an 
intriguing question, how could the local KPU not know the change, while the replacement of KPPS members in 
large numbers. Then who does the change, and for what motive or purpose is the change? Things that cannot be 
done by merely anyone, if the change is true and of course whoever makes the change is those who have a power 
that cannot be matched by the local KPU. The researcher believes that those who make changes are not just anyone, 
and who are certain that the perpetrators are those who have very strong access to power. 
Thirdly, on the D-day of Election, KPPS in 240 out of 324 polling stations do not hold the original forms of three 
types, but they only hold blank photocopies, all of which contain vital documents in the process of voting and 
counting, namely a form for recording minutes of collection and counting, votes at polling stations, certificate of 
results and details of vote counting at polling stations, and attachments to the notes on the results of legal 
holographic votes. According to the provisions, the three forms are held, filled, and accounted for by the KPPS as 
well as signed by the witnesses participating candidates in the elections. The three forms are the measurement of 
the integrity of the elections. If all of three forms do not exist or only slightly get damaged, furthermore if they are 
held by parties outside the KPPS, then the credibility of the voting and counting process in the polling station is 
no longer accountable. If the process at the polling station can no longer be accounted for, then it influences the 
recapitulation processes at the next stages. This is tantamount to the damage of the integrity of the election 
administration. Later it was revealed that the three blanks were in the local KPU Secretariat, and were filled by 
some staffs by transferring the results of filling out photocopies to three types of original blanks. 
3.3.2 The integrity of the Election Organizer 
In the tradition of elections in Indonesia, the organizers of the General Election consist of the ranks of the Election 
Commission (KPU) and the Election Supervisors (Bawaslu). Performing their tasks, they are bound by the code 
of ethics of the election organizers. If there is evidence of partiality, they can be examined in the sessions of the 
Election Organizers Honor Council (DKPP). In this Jayapura Regency Election, the organizers of the General 
Election were not only involved in the conflict but also showed partiality to the participants of the Election. The 
KPU at regency level rejected the Panwaslu recommendation regarding the PSU, while in the Panwaslu body of 
Jayapura Regency consisting of three people, with a conflict map that the chairman was suspected of siding with 
candidate number 1 and the other two members sided with candidate number 2, as well as two members of the 
local KPU including the chairman leaning towards candidate number 1, while only one person who is neutral and 
impartial, while three other members tend to side with candidate number 2 (Note 37). In the hearing on June 8, 
2017, DKPP imposes a temporary termination of sanctions to the Chairperson and KPU members, also to the 
Chairperson and Panwaslu members. In addition, the DKPP also imposed sanctions on no less than 25 election 
organizers including dismissing 15 Chairpersons/members of the Election organizers in Jayapura Regency. (Note 
38) 
3.4 Local Election in the Landscape of Political Decentralization  
The fall of the New Order in 1998 was immediately followed by political liberalization in Indonesia. The 
relationship between the center and the regions on the authority delegation was immediately affected by 
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liberalization in the regions. In the general sense, decentralization is defined as the regional liberalization. The 
strengthening regional dynamics is also supported by the transfer of material resources from Jakarta to regions in 
the form of money, people and goods. With decentralization and facilitated by fiscal policy, local actors are more 
comfortable to make the regions as an arena for political fights. With decentralization policy that including the 
form of administrative power of government, it encourages political actors in the regions to seize political value 
in the form of the implementation of regional elections. 
On the other hand, after the fall of Soeharto's New Order state, political actors who were under Soeharto's control 
spread to a number of political positions, and some of them survived at Golkar and transformed Golkar into a "new 
Golkar Party." Some established new political parties, but not a few also joined the new party made by a number 
of former military elites, former bureaucrats, or businessmen, and some of them joined PDI-Perjuangan led by 
Megawati Soekarnoputri. At the context of political diffusion, they spread to the regions to nominate themselves 
as members of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) representing the area from which the actors were born 
and were active in the New Order period. This DPD is a state high institution, which in each province is represented 
by four members of the election results. It is not a few of them to spread to their home to run for regional elections 
(governors, regents, and mayors). 
In the first decade after the fall of the New Order, the local political actors who were most prepared to face political 
decentralization were the bureaucrats who had previously, since the New Order era, mastered the local power 
structure which had become involved in the candidacy of the regional elections. Local entrepreneurs who were 
initially allergic to political life, because during the New Order period they were only used as "cash cows" by the 
New Order authorities who allied themselves with the military, later gained the opportunity to be involved in 
political activities and some of them registered or invited by local politicians and involved in political games in 
the elections. Local entrepreneurs have mastery of extractive resources at the local level, and such figures are most 
prepared with material to become rulers at the local level. It was seen in the decade of the early 2000s, at the local 
level, especially by taking the opportunity to become regional heads (governors, regents, and mayors), many 
regional heads with backgrounds from the senior bureaucrats of the New Order, with local entrepreneurs and/or 
opposition activists from the New Order. In the second decade after the 2010 reforms, a number of young 
generations who had held election management positions such as the KPU and/or Panwaslu, also eventually 
became candidates in the regional elections. 
The phenomenon that could be observed at the beginning of the introduction of decentralization policy was that 
political dynamics at the local level were not sufficient to be politically institutionalized. At the formal level, the 
delegation of authority as a consequence of the implementation of decentralization of government administration, 
which was immediately followed by material transfers with various schemes and are also part of the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization, encouraged regional level political actors to fight for positions of 
regional heads and deputy's heads area. In the first half of the decade of the 2000s, in line with the implementation 
of political decentralization in the form of regional head elections (Pilkada), political actors were encouraged to 
compete in the regional election contestation. The effect that later raised is that the regions become attractive 
political playing fields, in other words, the provinces, districts, and cities are dynamic political playing fields. The 
tug-of-war between political powers, sometimes colored by bringing issues of local sons, tribes, religions, races, 
and between groups. 
3.5 Structured Co-optation and the Role of Oligarchs 
Starting from the description above, what happened in the Pilkada in Jayapura Regency showed the role of the 
oligarchs' power and the role of the subordinate powers of the Election regime. In this case, the Election regime, 
which was formatted institutionally according to the Indonesian constitution, proved to be powerless in the front 
of the actions of the local oligarchs. The Election Regime that works with the influence of the local oligarchic 
regime in such a way creates such acute dependence sacrificing the integrity of the election organizers. In the case 
of Pilkada, it appears that the organization managed by the Election regime works with a high dependence on local 
oligarchic games with material motives. Social interactions between organizations produce mutually beneficial 
values. Parties depend on each other, while both benefit from the value of mutually beneficial material. In the case 
of the Jayapura Regency Election, the political actors in the Jayapura Regency during the Pilkada had a strong 
structure which was able to co-opt other forces, including within the ranks of government organizers and even the 
election administrators. The most powerful actors are the one controlling the structural power of government like 
the ranks of the State Civil Apparatus (ASN) including their officials. If this thesis is related to the actions of 19 
district heads in Jayapura Regency during the Pilkada, as the Jayapura District Court verdict convicted of actions 
beneficial to candidate number 2, then the theory of resource dependence is relevant to explain the problems of 
Jayapura Regency Election. 
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On the other hand, political co-optation can take an involvement in the structural power of the Jayapura Regency 
Election. As known, the most important and strongest political actors in each region, especially with the absence 
of function of public control, the state-based political actor is the only one that is most powerful in a region. The 
role of the most powerful political actor can be played by the head of the region. Then, how to explain the turnover 
of 1,002 KPPS a day before the Jayapura Regency Election Day? The new KPPS can only be appointed through 
the involvement of lower-level officials, or under the district, namely the subdistrict level. With regard to the 
explanation above, the role of regional heads and deputy regional heads, especially those who are running for 
office, have a very strong position. In other cases, other stakeholders also have an important role, but in areas with 
no adequate control functions, political actors sometimes instead play a balance function, but in many cases, it is 
actually part of the actor who is directly co-opted by the oligarchs both in direct and indirect ways. In the case of 
this regional election, the oligarchs were played by state and non-state-based actors with political resources and 
finally found their playing arena in this election. With a network of wealth, family, or connections with key holders 
within the local political structure, they urged officials and organizers of the local elections to win their political 
candidacy. In this case, the reason why the Pilkada in Jayapura full of chaos is due to the actions of oligarchs who 
play electoral democracy. 
Borrowing a term from Winters, who developed the concept of oligarchy more extensively, what happened in the 
Jayapura Regional Election was "the power of few people to control many people," but became the material basis 
and their efforts to continue to control all games and rules through the control of material resources, resulting in 
inequality in accessing material resources. Thus, it is tantamount to giving births to inequality in the context of 
accessing political resources. This happened because the limited access to economic resources by most people in 
the regions resulted in limited access to decision-making in Indonesia. In the case of the Jayapura Regional 
Election, which is the proxy of the latest Indonesian electoral democracy, new oligarchs have emerged, 
accompanied by democratization as a negative symptom. Weak political actors with limited resources of power 
structures have succeeded in being co-opted by oligarchs holding political monopoly rights due to economic 
motives. One of the most observable political phenomena in Indonesia lately is that actors at the top of power must 
adjust to the new democratic game. They not only do it easily but also dominate electoral democracy. 
Starting from the description above, the Election regime is unable to deal with the onslaught of the structure of co-
optative power and oligarchs in Jayapura Regency. The second influence above dictates the power next to it, 
namely the Election regime, which although designed independently in a vertical structure, but in fact is 
unstoppable by the co-optation of the power structure and fraudulent practices of oligarchs. In other words, the 
dependence of the Election regime on local co-optation and oligarch regimes turned out to be stronger and even 
broke down the independence of Election organizers. Following the theory of resource dependence, the reliance 
on A (the local co-optation and oligarchs authority regime) played by B (the local election regime), has succeeded 
in taking in the example of Jayapura District Election disintegration. Dependency B is balanced with interests B 
placed above goal A indirectly and vice versa balanced with the usefulness of these objectives on B outside of 
relationality between A and B. The case of disintegration in the Jayapura Election can be read as a major part of 
the destruction of democracy in the local level. 
3.6 National Political Constellation Perspective 
Compared to the regime of Soeharto’s New Order, the relations between local and national government is much 
more advanced due to more democratic approaches of the national government. The policy of contemporary 
political decentralization has stimulated the political participation which deemed a must in growing democratic 
and developing countries like Indonesia. The development is also encouraged by the systemic change on the 
people’s representation and region’s representation, another implication of Indonesia’s constitutional amendment 
in Indonesia’s reform era (2006, pp. 123). The amendment successfully eliminated the New Order's centripetal 
pattern which became the root of the political strain between Jakarta and the regions. The strain is because of the 
repression of national government towards the regions along the period of New Order which is also worsened with 
the corrupted behavior of the Jakarta. The vanished strain between the national and local government, however, 
led to the radicalization of the decentralization since some parties understand that the fall of New Orders would 
leave the local political acquisition to no one. Within the year of 1997 to 2001, there was a huge various social 
movement against the rulers of New Orders, as shown by the increasing offensive of Free Papua Movement (OPM). 
With regard to counter all political pressures, the national government transformed the relations between center 
and regions, which was originally in the pattern of centripetal since New Order, to be centrifugal in the era of 
Reform (Freedman, 2006, pp. 125). With a centrifugal pattern of policy, the national government transferred the 
concentration of political power, which was all in the center, to regions. With this pattern, the center allocated a 
huge portion of power to regions so that the understanding, attention, and resolution towards local problems should 
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not be done by the national government but by the local government. The effect of this transformation is the 
strengthening of local capacity diffusions spread throughout all autonomous regions in Indonesia. With this 
paradigm, the establishment of a strong central government is only possible if the autonomous regions are able to 
maximally utilize the local resources. This phenomenon is fathomed as the political decentralization in the form 
of local autonomy which was introduced and applied in more comprehensive manners in contemporary Indonesia 
politics. 
Along the implementation of the local election, the dynamics of local politics have been running up and down 
constantly. Mostly, the implementation of the local election has gone excellent, fair, peaceful and democratic – a 
sign of democracy maturity of its people. However, there is still some regions' election conducted and finished in 
negative ways such as the rise of horizontal conflicts, social clash or social furry which might lead to involving 
the local oligarchs' power causing numbers of deaths. The rise of those negative political traits, in spite of being a 
consequence of the political participation significant increase, is also part of the consequence of the power 
distribution between state-society relations because of the political reform. When the state-based political power 
(governing-elite) and the non-state power (non-governing elite) or other pressure groups were faced to run for 
local political power with different intentions to win the local election, then horizontal social frictions are inevitable. 
Thus, those negative political traits are, besides a part of the consequences of the implementation of political 
decentralization, caused by the shift of interaction pattern between state and society in the contemporary state 
structural power post-New Order. 
The phenomenon of local election as explained above are part of the political excesses of the political shift from 
centered-government to decentralized-government which has not yet reached political maturity. The phenomenon 
is merely the manifestation of the explosion of political participation which was deemed natural in a country which 
is still in the process of democratic transition. Conceptually, in the life of democracy, it is possible for the public 
to have control, to solidify public opinion and to mobilize the mass power with only one intention which is to 
influence the process of decision making by the elites. In the case of Papua, the easternmost province of Indonesia 
which was treated unfairly by the central government, the democracy institutionalization only creates a conducive 
political atmosphere for segmented and particular political groups. However, it has not yet strengthened a proper 
political institutionalization and resulted in established political structures and institutions, which potentially 
unable the political groups to pursue their aspirations, innovations, and interest in a proper way. Furthermore, in 
the case of the 2017 Jayapura Local Election, the construction of democratic institutions has not yet strengthened 
the role of critical groups which should be balancers of state power. 
4. Conclusion 
The explanation of the Jayapura Regency Election in 2017 is the imagery description of the official electoral 
structure run by the election administration regime, alongside the operation of the shadow structure run by the 
local oligarchy regime. Even though the election administration regime was designed with independent structures, 
regulated by work functions in the law, and provided with a code of ethics, it was mercilessly attacked by the 
actions of the oligarchy regime as seen in the case of Jayapura Regency Election. In organizing elections, the first 
regime was mocked by the second regime, through a number of steps, which in principle succeeded in undermining 
the principles of integrity of the election, through the replacement of most polling stations in all districts, 
manipulation of voting and counting documents at polling stations , opposition by district heads to PSU 
recommendations, and other previous efforts such as the involvement of a number of officials. This assumption 
justifies the old thesis that developed in Election organizers, who stated that the integrity of the election 
administration, which consists of the integrity of the stages and the integrity of the election results is largely 
determined by the integrity of the election organizers. 
In the perspective of the interests of the oligarchs, regional posture is an area that belongs only to the oligarchs, as 
a result of the policy of political decentralization since the beginning of the fall of the New Order state, while the 
character of oligarchs at the local level is actually a group well-established arena for local games, even though in 
fact it is not the true oligarchs, which in many European countries are in close proximity to the controls of the 
middle class and civil society. In the perspective of the interests of electoral democracy, as far as it appears in the 
Jayapura Regency Election, it is only a chain of long chains of mastery of extractive resources and political 
resources. Nevertheless, this Pilkada can be ended by the involvement of state institutions such as the 
Constitutional Court and the Honorary Council of Election Organizers, which carry out according to their duties, 
authorities, and obligations. Through their decisions, they succeeded in ending the crisis of the Jayapura Regency 
Election. Furthermore, the political liberalization, especially in the case of Jayapura Regency election in 2017, 
indicates that the political constellation after the fall of the New Order was inevitably dominated by local oligarchs. 
However, other political institutions such as Non-Governmental Organizations still were deemed insufficient to 
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challenge the power of local oligarchs. In other words, the phenomenon of Jayapura local election is a 
manifestation of the failure of electoral democracy.• 
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